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Abstract
The mathematization of economics is almost exclusively in terms of the
mathematics of real analysis which, in turn, is founded on set theory (and
the axiom of choice) and orthodox mathematical logic. In this paper I try
to point out that this kind of mathematization is replete with economic
infelicities. The attempt to extract these infelicities is in terms of three
main examples: dynamics, policy and rational expectations and learning.
The focus is on the role and reliance on standard xed point theorems in
orthodox mathematical economics.
JEL Classications : C02, C60, D50, E 61
Keywords : General Equilibrium Theory, Mathematical Economics,
Theory of Policy, Rational Expectations Equilibrium
I am invoking three meanings of this word, simultaneously. Firstly, in the sense of one of
the meanings given in The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Princi-
ples as an argument or arguer against(orthodox mathematical economics); secondly, in the
sense of to swindle, trick(given in Longmans Concise English Dictionary); thirdly, in
the sense of a condence trick, as used in US English slang. The second and third senses
are, of course, closely related. I suspect it is the third sense that is invoked in the justly cele-
brated articles by Leamer ([26]) and Roth ([40]) on econometrics and experimental economics,
respectively.
yOf course, no one is implicated in any of the errors and omissions that remain in this nal
version of a paper that has been in embryo for many years. However, I cannot help suspecting
that my critical friends, Tom Boylan, Bob Clower, Duncan Foley, Steve Kinsella, Francesco
Luna, John McCall, Srinivas Raghavendran and Stefano Zambelli may have tried, without
much success, to ameliorate the infelicities by gentle suggestions. Alas, pure stubbornness is
the only reason for my mule-headed refusal, sometimes, to take into account their sensible
suggestions, particularly with regard to tone and nuance.
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1 Preamble
"It has been correctly said that mathematical economics is ying
high these days. So I come, not to praise mathematics, but rather
to slightly debunk its use in economics. I do so out of tenderness for
the subject, since I rmly believe in the virtues of understatement
and lack of pretension."
Paul Samuelson ([41], p.58; italics added)
Edward Leamers eloquent critique ([26]) of the dissonance between the prac-
tice of econometric research and its public dissemination via articles in peer-
reviewed journals brought to the forefront the dilemmas faced by an econome-
trician who was also an experimenter. Alvin Roth, a little over a decade after
Leamer, took up a similar issue confronting the experimental economist, as that
subject itself came of age ([40]) - warning of the pitfalls inherent in the diver-
gence between the way we report experiments ... and the way an experiment
is actually conducted. Leamer, however, concluded that the atmosphere of
econometric discourse would be sweetened, if serious attention was paid to two
words: whimsey and fragility :
"In order to draw inferences from data as described by economet-
ric texts, it is necessary to make whimsical assumptions. The pro-
fessional audience consequently and properly withholds belief until
an inference is shown to be adequately insensitive to the choice of
assumptions. The haphazard way we individually and collectively
study the fragility of inferences leaves most of us unconvinced that
any inference is believable. If we are to make e¤ective use of our
scarce data resource, it is therefore important that we study fragility
in a much more systematic way. If it turns out that almost all in-
ferences from economic data are fragile, I suppose we shall have to
revert to our old methods .... ."
[26], p.43; italics added
In this paper I aim to point out that the dilemmas discussed by Leamer and
Roth for econometrics and experimental economics are alive and well also in
mathematical economics. I shall, in analogy with Leamer, discuss this dilemma
paying close attention to the two words whimsey and fragility but, implicitly in
the case of the latter, also in terms of the fragility of deduction1 in addition to
1One aspect this fragility of deductionwas perceptively noted by Samuelson (op.cit, pp.
59-60):
"[T]here is for all of us a psychological problem of making correct deductions.
That is why pencils have erasers and electronic calculators have bells and gongs.
I suppose this is what Alfred Marshall must have had in mind when he
followed John Stuart Mill in speaking of the dangers involved in long chains
of logical reasoning. Marshall treated such chains as if their truth content was
subject to radioactive decay and leakage .... . Obviously, in making such
a statement, Marshall was describing a property of that biological biped or
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the fragility of inferences. In fact, the way I shall discuss and demonstrate the
role of whimsey and fragility in the conning that is mathematical economics,
it will become evident that the fragility of inferences is a by-product of the
whimsical assumptions of mathematical economics.
It may not be out of place, given the nature of this paper, to point out that
Sir MIchael Atiyehs Fields Institute Lecture in Toronto, given in June 2000,
was titled, Mathematics in the 20th Century ([2]). Signicantly, he began with
an important caveat emptor2(p.1):
"I will say nothing .. about the great events in the area between logic
and computing associated with the names of people like Hilbert,
Gödel and Turing."
I shall, however, try to dissect conning in mathematical economics primarily
on the basis of the great events in the area between logic and computation, in
particular mathematical logic and theories of computation, thus encompassing
both recursion theory and constructive mathematics in the latter and some
non-classical logics in the former.
I shall illustrate the role and mode of conning in mathematical economics by
discussing three famous examples in economics: the role, functions and claims
made for the Walrasian Auctioneer 3 ; the various formulations and conclusions
about the scope for formal policy, particularly in macroeconomics; and the
formalization of the notion of a Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE ) using
topological xed-point theorems and then, separately, the devising of learning
mechanisms to determine it.
The paper is, therefore, structured as follows. In the next section I discuss,
formally, the meaning and (extravagant) claims on economic dynamics by the
mathematical economists and show the nature of cons involved in the various
formal exercises. In §3, a similar exercise is attempted for the formalized theory
of economic policy. The kind of conning implicit and explicit in the x-point
approach to REE is the subject matter of §4. In the concluding section, §5, spec-
ulative hints are discussed on how a Conless Mathematical Economics might be
devised, paying close attention to the interaction between the ontology of eco-
nomic entities and their quantitative realisations and verications4 . I include a
substantial discussion of an alternative tradition in game theory, unfortunately
computing machine called homo sapiens ; for he certainly could not be describing
a property of logical implication."
My own focus will be on the fragility of deduction, whether of long or short chains of
reasoning, due to the background implicit assumptions in almost every step of any such
chains of reasoning and the nature of the deductive process itself. Thus, for example, in
assuming a continuum of agents and then reasoning as if a particular agent in the continuum
can be identied requires the explicit assumption of the axiom of choice ; hence, that particular
identication is algorithmically non-e¤ ective.
2To be read, instead of let the buyer be aware, as let the reader be aware!
3Alias the Walrasian Demon, for the purposes of this paper (see below for the justication
for the alias).
4 I choose to use this word quite deliberately and not the more Popperian - whimsical -
word, falsication, that is uncritically adopted, particularly in econometric discourse.
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quite unfamiliar to most economists - even those who may well be fairly com-
petent in mathematics - with the purpose of debunking the con that is implied
in uncritical invoking of and reliance on the axiom of choice.
In a sense the main theme of the paper is the attempt to disabuse economic
theorists in general, and mathematical economists in particular, of uncritical
reliance on, and unwarranted acceptance, of certain kinds of mathematical for-
malizations and uncritical or ignorant acceptance of controversial or meaning-
less mathematical axioms.. Such mathematical formalizations, I argue in terms
of the main three examples, leads to the cons that are replete in a kind of
mathematical economics that relies on them for formalizations, theorizing and
inferences. Reliance on them leads to whimsical assumptions, entirely deter-
mined and dictated by the mathematics and not by the ontology of economic
entities, institutions and behaviour. As a consequence the inferences are in-
herently fragile or even senseless, since they require impossible approximations
from uncomputable entities and undecidable propositions.
The main - but not the sole one - culprit is easy to identify. It is best iden-
tied in terms of a programmatic assertion - not a proof or an inference from
empirical or experimental observations - by the doyen of 20th century mathe-
matical economics, Gerard Debreu. In his Frisch Memorial Lecture , delivered
at MIT in August, 1985, he asserts the following5 :
" "Thus von Neumanns lemma, reformulated in 1941 as Kakutanis
xed point theorem, was an accident within an accidental paper6 .
But in a global historical view, the perfect t between the mathe-
matical concept of a xed point and the social science concept of an
equilibrium stands out. .... In this view, xed point theorems were
slated for the prominent part they played in game theory and in the
theory of general economic equilibrium after John Nashs one-page
note of 1950."
Debreu ([14], p. 1262; italics added)
He may well be right about the mathematical concept of a xed-point, but
his unawareness of the existence of di¤erent kinds of xed point theorems-
especially recursion theoretic xed point theorems - shunted the formalization
of economic theory in a direction that made it prone to conning, particularly
about dynamics, in general, and processes, such as learning, in particular.
As a result of this monomaniacal reliance and belief in the validity of the
assertion that there is a perfect t between [particular kinds of] xed point
5This is a theme, with minor variations, Debreu has emphasized in various writings since
the early 80s (cf., for example [12] and [15]). The other mathematical concept to which he
makes reference in a similar fashion is the separating hyperplane theorem (or the Hahn-Banach
theorem). My strictures against the particular kind of x-point theorems to which he and his
followers appeal and invoke for use in economic theory apply equally forcefully and rigorously
also the use, invoking and application of such dualitytheorems.
6 It is not clear that von Neumanns growth paper (presented, rst, in 1932, published in
German in 1938 and in English in 1945-6, [66]) was, in fact, an accident within an accidental
paper(cf. [20]).
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theorems and the social science concept of equilibrium, all kinds of problems
in economics have been forced into a formalization that can exploit the use of
such theorems. A whole subject has been conned into believing this perfect t
on no empirical, experimental or even historical grounds or necessity. It was
not an economist but an eminent applied mathematician who had the courage,
hindsight and foresight to point out that:
"We return to the subject of equilibrium theory. The existence
theory of the static approach is deeply rooted to the use of the
mathematics of xed point theory. Thus one step in the libera-
tion from the static point of view would be to use a mathematics
of a di¤erent kind. Furthermore, proofs of xed point theorems
traditionally use di¢ cult ideas of algebraic topology, and this has
obscured the economic phenomena underlying the existence of equi-
libria. Also the economic equilibrium problem presents itself most
directly and with the most tradition not as a xed point problem,
but as an equation, supply equals demand. Mathematical econo-
mists have translated the problem of solving this equation
into a xed point problem.
I think it is fair to say that for the main existence problems
in the theory of economic equilibrium, one can now bypass the
xed point approach and attack the equations directly to
give existence of solutions, with a simpler kind of mathe-
matics and even mathematics with dynamic and algorithmic
overtones."
[51], p.290; bold emphasis added.
Smale could have added that there is a simpler kind of mathematicsthat
combines the notion of xed points and algorithms - hence dynamics - in one
fell swoop. The implications are that we have not only been conned into for-
malizing unnaturally; but have also been conned into using a more complex
mathematics7 .
2 Exposing the DynamicsCon in Economic The-
ory
We have got accustomed to referring to computable and constructive methods
of algorithmic analysis in the digital mode in economic theory. However, at the
7The kind of uncritical acceptance of a conning exercise like that which is here pointed out
by Smale leads to further irrelevant cons like the following (Suzumura, [56], p.67):
"Some years ago, Professor Uzawa established a remarkable theorem to the
e¤ect that the Walrasexistence theorem and the Brouwer xed point theorem
are equivalent. The importance of this equivalence theorem lies in the fact
that it accounts for the intrinsic necessity of the xed point type of topological
considerations in the analysis of general economic equilibrium.
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outset, our neoclassical masters, when they referred to the market as an equation
solver, were thinking in terms of analogue devices8 . It is worth pointing out then,
at the outset, that the explicit computing tradition in economics can be said
to have begun with Walrass fertile idea of tâtonnement and Paretos famous
invoking of the analogy of the markets dynamics as a solver of an equilibrium
system of equations. The key distinction between the two great neo-classical
pioneers of general equilibrium theory is that Walras envisaged tâtonnement to
be a gedankenexperiment to organise his thoughts about equilibrium solutions
to a multi-market system of equations9 ; Pareto, on the other hand, was explicit
that market dynamics was acting as a solver for the equilibrium of a system of
simultaneous equations:
It may be mentioned here that this [analytic] determination
has by no means the purpose to arrive at a numerical calculation
of prices. Let us make the most favourable assumption for such
a calculation, let us assume that we have triumphed over all the
di¢ culties of nding the data of the problem and that we know the
ophelimités of all the di¤erent commodities for each individual, and
all the conditions of production of all the commodities, etc. This
is already an absurd hypothesis to make. Yet it is not su¢ cient to
make the solution of the problem possible. We have seen that in
the case of 100 persons and 700 commodities there will be 70,699
conditions (actually a great number of circumstances which we have
so far neglected will further increase that number); we shall therefore
have to solve a system of 70,699 equations. This exceeds practically
the power of algebraic analysis, and this is even more true if one
contemplates the fabulous number of equations which one obtains
for a population of forty millions and several thousand commodities.
In this case the rôles would be changed: it would not be mathe-
matics which would assist political economy, but political economy
would assist mathematics. In other words, if one really could know
all these equations, the only means to solve them which is available
to human powers is to observe the practical solution given by the
market.
[34], pp. 233-4; italics added
The pioneers, therefore, were trying to supplement their formalizations of
the supply demand equilibrium nexus with a mechanism for solving for equi-
librium. The separation between proving existence of an equilibrium and nding
methods to solve for it was not part of the tradition of 19th (or earlier) century
8 I have discussed the possible role of analogue computing in economic dynamics in a recent
paper and shall not further touch on that topic in this paper ([61].
9He did not, as generations of critical mathematical economists have alleged, simply count
equations and variables and satisfy himself about the existence of solutions in a facile way;
he was, after all, a 19th century scientist, for whom solving an equation still meant devising
methods to nd the solution. The somnambulance of existence proofs without accompanying
constructions had to wait for the 20th century. Progress and its paradoxes have many facets.
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mathematics (as mentioned earlier). However a natural formalization of the
problem of supply equals demand, without conning us into believing that the
real numbers are the adequate, ideal or the default domain, is as a Diophan-
tine decision problem10 . This suggests that the market mechanism, in seeking
and, perhaps, nding equilibrium prices, is solving the formally unsolvable! This
would imply hypotheses or thought experiments on plausible economic processes
suggesting that they might, in fact, be formal algorithms, not necessarily subject
to the strictures of the Church-Turing Thesis. Any such thought experiment on
feasible economic processes not subject to the strictures of the Church-Turing
Thesis raises the question of the formal meaning of mechanism and whether
or not the economic system is to be viewed as a non-mechanism. I shall use
the term relying on the classic denition given by Gandy ([18]) and a series of
exceptionally suggestive questions and tentative answers broached by Kreisel
on the question of mechanism (for example, [21], [22]), Clearly the market sys-
tem functions in ways that violate these denitions and characterizations, and
hence any claims about constructing mechanisms or algorithms to depict its
smooth and successful functioning, as made by orthodox economic theorists is
an unadulterated con.
In his characteristically prescient fashion, Steve Smale, although not an
economist, hit upon the central problem confronting the dynamic economic the-
orist by stating, as the 8th of 18 Mathematical Problemsfor the 21st Century
- in Hilbertian Mode- the following11 :
"Extend the mathematical model of general equilibrium theory to in-
clude price adjustments"
[53], p.10; italics in original
The analogy of the dynamics of a market mechanism in search of an equi-
librium of supply and demand12 with the paradigmatic actions and functions of
a computer13 has a long and distinguished tradition in economics. The chang-
ing mathematical underpinnings and formalisms, with the evolution not only
10 In a sense I was inspired to move in this direction as a result of Smales e¤orts show how
the existence proof for equilibria can be based on Sards theorem and calculus foundations ..
[using] equations such as "supply equals demand" .. rather than xed points, [52]. I have
dealt with this approach in greater detail in [62]..
11The prelude to the actual statement of the 8th Problemreads as follows:
"The following problem is not one of pure mathematics, but lies on the inter-
face of economics and mathematics. It has been solved only in quite limited
situations."
[53], p.10
12There is an implicit teleological element in stating the dynamics of a market mechanism
in search of an equilibrium of supply and demand. From Adam Smiths famous observation
that the economic agent is ..led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part
of his intentionright through all the modern classics - particularly those inspired by Hayek -
the teleological element has been kept in a penumbra, so to speak. I hope the reader will not
try to place the teleological element in the forefront of my mild distortion of a noble tradition.
13During the rst hundred years of the invoking of this analogy, the idea of a computer,
in the economists who referred to it, was conned to its analog incarnation. Since then the
analogy has exclusively (and often explicitly) referred to the digital computer. The emphasis
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of the sophistication of mathematical economics but also of the development
of mathematics, has brought the question of price adjustments of a market
mechanism within the formal ambit of both recursion theory and constructive
analysis. It is reasonably well known that the hypotheses of economic theory
imply non-recursive outcomes even if the input data is computable. Against the
backdrop provided by this theory, and assuming as usually done in economics
that economic activity takes place in continuous time and market decisions are,
in general, asynchronous, it is easy to show, experimentally, how Turing Ma-
chine constructions can be devised to show the generation of non-computable
economic data.
The tricky question of how such uncomputable data can be used for inference
and in which way they become inputs again into the dynamic economic system
is one important aspect of the conning exercise in this part of economic theory.
How can one infer anything in a quantitative mode from uncomputable data?
By denition uncomputable data cannot even be represented in any meaningful
nite mode.
In a perceptive review of the important papers by Pour-El and Richards
([36]), Kreisel ([22], p.900) observed:
"The [papers by Pour-El and Richards] add to the long lists of
operations  in analysis with some recursive inputI for which no
output in (I) is recursive. ... Familiar examples are provided by (i)
Brouwers xed point theorem in dimension >1 .... where I ranges
over (i) continuous maps of the unit circle into itself ... and where
(I) is the set of (i) xed points.... ."
Contrast this with the fundamental theorem of Computable General Eco-
nomic Equilibrium Theory :
Theorem 1 The Walrasian Equilibrium Existence Theorem (WEET) is equiv-
alent to the Brouwer Fixed Point theorem (BFPT)14 .
on the mathematics of computation and mathematical logic in my e¤orts to expose conning
in mathematical economics is partly due to this latter analogy. If the reader keeps in mind
the following perceptive observation, then the main thrust of the arguments in this paper will
be clear:
"The badly named real number system is one of the triumphs of the human
mind. It underlies the calculus and higher analysis to such a degree that we
may forget how impossible it is to deal with real numbers in the real world of
nite computers. But, however much the real number system simplies analysis,
practical computing must do without it."
Forsyth ([17], p.932; italics in the original)
14For the benet of readers unfamiliar with either or one of these celebrated theorems, here
are two concise statements. Dene the unit simplex as:
S+n 
n
p j p 2 R+n+1& k p k= 1
o
(1)
Theorem 2 Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem
Let f : S+n ! S+n , where f is continuous. Then there is a p 2 S+n s.t p = f(p)
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Now, mathematical equivalence between two propositions entails not just
that each implies the other; but it also means that the objects dened by
each of the propositions are, mathematically identical. In other words, in the
world of mathematical objects, the two objects dened by the two proposi-
tions are, ostensibly, simply the same items with two di¤erent names. Kreisels
perceptive point, therefore, means that the Walrasian economic equilibrium is
non-recursive. This means whatever economic process is devised, observed or
inferred to locate or reach the equilibrium must, at some point in its path - per-
haps just at the nalstep - transform a recursive input into a non-recursive
output. How can a realistic or meaningful mechanism be devised, at least as a
thought experiment, to perform this transformation? Even a die-hard orthodox
mathematical economist or economic theorist must admit that only some form
of serious conning can achieve this - i.e., a ctitious mechanism which, even if
postulated to possess ideal properties can achieve the transformation only by
conning.
I have demonstrated, in [60], how the hypotheses underlying WEET, to-
gether with the naive tâtonnement dynamics of:
dp
dt
= z(p) (2)
can be shown to be consistent with the following theorem in Pour-El and
Richards (op.cit, p. 61):
Theorem 4 There exists an ordinary di¤erential equation with initial condition
'0(t) = F (t; '(t)); '(0) = 0 (3)
such that F (x; y) is computable on the rectangle f0  x  1; 1  y  1g,
but no solution of the di¤erential equation is computable on any interval [0; ],
 > 0.
Using the recursive construction deftly used by Pour-El and Richards it
can be shown how a mechanism can be envisaged for tâtonnement dynamics
to generate the equilibrium uncomputable solutions. The best that an applied,
empirical or experimental economist can do under these circumstances is to as-
sume disequilibria, since approximating uncomputable equilibrium solutions is a
meaningless activity. The whole exercise shows the fundamental dissonance be-
tween reckless mathematical theory and impossible empirical and experimental
inferences.
Theorem 3 Walrasian Equilibrium Existence Theorem:
Let z : S+n ! R+n+1 s.t:
(1). z(p) is continuous 8p 2 S
(2).p:z(p) = 0, 8p 2 S; Then:
9p 2 S+n s.t z(p)  0
with pi = 0 for i s.t zi(p) < 0.
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To put the nature of the task facing the Walrasian Demon15 in complete
perspective let me also state the problem in terms of mappings (discrete time).
The naively equivalent mapping for the dynamics of tâtonnement, as given in
textbooks for example, is:
pt+1 =
pt +(pt)
[pt +(pt)]e
(4)
Where (Pt): mapping depending on the excess demand function, z(p);
e: the appropriately dimensioned normalizing column vector;
The economic signicance and mathematical purpose of this mapping is
encapsulated in Scarfs lucid description of what exactly is accomplished by
this mapping:
The particular mapping is a modication of the fundamental
price adjustment mechanism in which prices are revised in propor-
tion to excess demand the discrepancy between demand and sup-
ply. If the mapping is iterated, we obtain a sequence of price vectors,
each one responsive to the excess demand evaluated at the previous
price vector. While economic intuition might suggest that this se-
quence of price vectors converges to an equilibrium price vector,
this need not be the case. Unless some restrictive assumptions are
placed on the excess demand functions, the price sequence may os-
cillate and approach no limit at all. On the other hand, the xed
point implied by Brouwers theorem does indeed serve as an equilib-
rium price vector. [This] illustrates quite well the role that Brouwers
theorem has played in providing existence proofs, rather than a con-
structive and computationally oriented procedure, for obtaining an
equilibrium price vector.
[43], p.30; italics added
Note two standard infelicities in this otherwise impeccably orthodox obser-
vation: prices are revised, but who by?; secondly, the mapping is iterated
by what mechanism and who keeps account of the process? This is where the
omniscience and omnipotency of the Walrasian Demon is implicitly invoked in
the analysis of market dynamics. Omniscience, omnipotent or omni whatever
notwithstanding, the basic task of the Walrasian Demon is to nd a way of
processing recursive inputs to produce (at least one) non-recursive output. This
means somehow, somewhere, the Walrasian Demon will have to violate one or
the other of Gandys ([18]) dening criteria for mechanisms. Let me suggest
15The cognoscenti would have realised that I am using the term Walrasian Demon in
analogy with the term Maxwells Demon. Of course it is the Walrasian Auctioneer that I
am re-naming the Walrasian Demon. Some may even know that Axel Leijonhufvud, when he
coined the term Walrasian Auctioneer, did so in analogy with his (incomplete) understanding
of the scope and functions of Maxwells Demon, as gleaned from his reading of the Mr Tomp-
kins books of George Gamov. The tortuous history of false analogies add to confusion and
conning, as evidenced by some totally absurd remarks by Robert Axtell regarding the formal
computational capabilities of the Walrasian Auctioneer (cf. [5]).
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another of the ways - in addition to the one suggested above via the Pour-
El/Richards theorem - the Walrasian Demon might devise a strategy to locate
the non-recursive equilibrium.
For concreteness and simplicity I shall only consider the scalar case. Gener-
alising it to a vector equilibrium is conceptually immediate although technically
much more complicated. Let the non-recursive Walrasian economic equilibrium
be #. Consider:
	(p) = (p+ #) (mod 1) for 	 : [0; 1)! [0; 1) (5)
	 is, therefore, given by:
	(p) = f p+ #; 0  p < 1  #
p+ #  1; 1  #  p < 1 (6)
To generate a binary sequence using the techniques of symbolic dynamics,
dene:
(p) = 0 for x 2 [0; 1  #) (7)
(p) = 1 for x 2 [1  #; 1) (8)
Now, apply Q to 	, initialising it on 0, and generate the binary sequence
fng, i.e.,
n =  (	 (0)) , n 2 Z+ (9)
It is easy to show that the long-term average of the sequence fng is # which,
by construction, is the Lebesgue measure of that part of the interval that maps
to 1 under ; i.e.,
if N  number of 10s in fn : 1  n  g (10)
then lim
!1 
 1N = # (11)
Thus, the best that the Walrasian Demon can generate is the non-recursive
equilibrium value as a long run equilibrium outcome16 .
But do we need this extra-territorial being, theWalrasian Demon, to perform
this task? Does it possess any special knowledge or skills that ordinary mortals
do not (thinking, again, analogously with the special characteristic of being a
tiny, molecular, sized being the Maxwell Demon was, to perform the task of a
gatekeeper to disorderly molecules)? Seemingly not. Therefore, we can actually
dispense with any and all assumption of such a being and assume, hereafter,
that any rational economic agent can perform the same task, given the necessary
mathematical and computing skills. This is precisely what is assumed in any
16But we in economics are only painfully aware of the great Keynesian aphorism: In the
long run we are all dead !
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mathematical economic framework where the assumption of the representative
agent is fundamental. So, there is no point in exorcising the Walrasian Demon
since it is embodied in the person of the omniscient representative agent, where
the conning is supremely dominant via the embodiment of attributes that go
beyond mechanism (in the Gandian17 sense).
3 Dissecting Conning in the Mathematical The-
ory of Economic Policy
I shall assume that elementary characterizable18 attractorsare the standard
limit points, limit cycles and strange (i.e., chaotic) attractors. All known
dynamical systems in economic theory belong to one of these attractors. In
particular, macroeconomic growth and cycle theories (including growth cycle
theories), can be shown to lead to one of the elementary attractors. Then,
given the observable trajectories of a dynamical system, say computed using
simple Poincarè maps or the like, an elementary characterizable attractor is
one that can be associated with a Finite Automaton19 . Thus, limit points, limit
cycles and strange attractors are e¤ectively characterizable in a computably triv-
ial sense. This means that every dynamical system encapsulating or represent-
ing any kind of dynamics in economic theory, particularly in macrodynamics,
is computably trivial. I need not emphasise the nature of the conning exercise
perpetrated by the purveyors of dynamics in economics, if this notion of trivial
is to be taken seriously.
Only dynamical systems capable of computation universalityare non-trivial
in a computable sense. However, dynamical systems capable of computation uni-
versality have to be associated with Turing Machines. Such dynamical systems,
by a formal process of elimination can be shown to be those that are poised del-
icately at the boundaries of the elementary characterizable dynamical systems.
Constructing them is as delicate a task as constructing a dynamical system to
generate equilibrium uncomputable solutions.
Thus, trajectories that are generated by dynamical systems poised on the
boundaries of the basins of attractions of simple attractors may possess undecid-
able properties due to the ubiquity of the Halting problem for Turing Machines,
the emergence of Busy Beavers (i.e., uncomputabilities), etc. Any theory of
policy, i.e., any rule - xed or discretionary - that is a function of the values
of the dynamics of an economy formalized as a dynamical system capable of
computation universality, will share these exotic properties.
I shall assume, simply for the sake of the discussion in this paper, an abstract
17 I hope the readers do not think this is a misspelling of Gandhian!!
18By characterizable I shall understand e¤ective characterization of dening basins of
attraction, using e¤ectivein the strict sense of recursion theory and basin of attractionin
the sense in which it is dened in formal dynamical systems theory (but see below, too).
19The analogy here is like that between the Chomsky hierarchy of formal languages and
abstract computing machines. Wolfram, in [67], developed these ideas in the direction that I
am trying to exploit here.
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model of a complex economy, or of an economy capable of complex behaviour,
to be a dynamical system capable of computation universality. By implication,
then, the converse - i.e., a simple economy- is one whose dynamics is formal-
izable as a Finite Automaton. This means that we have been conned by the
purveyors of economic dynamics in the mathematical mode into accepting the
formalization of complex economic dynamics by simple attractors! Is any act
of conning more treacherous than this? Perhaps the two mentioned above are
candidates?
I shall now assume familiarity with the formal denition of a dynamical
system (cf. for example, the obvious and accessible classic, [19] or the more
modern, [7]), the necessary associated concepts from dynamical systems theory
and all the necessary notions from classical computability theory (for which
the reader can, with prot and enjoyment, go to a classic like [39] or, at the
frontiers, to [9]). Just for ease of reference the bare bones of relevant denitions
for dynamical systems are given below in the usual telegraphic form20 . An
intuitive understanding of the denition of a basin of attraction is probably
su¢ cient for a complete comprehension of the main result - provided there is
reasonable familiarity with the denition and properties of Turing Machines (or
partial recursive functions or equivalent formalisms encapsulated by the Church-
Turing Thesis).
Denition 5 The Initial Value Problem (IVP) for an Ordinary Di¤erential
Equation (ODE) and Flows. Consider a di¤erential equation:
_x = f(x) (12)
where x is an unknown function of t 2 I (say, t : time and I an open interval
of the real line) and f is a given function of x. Then, a function x is a solution
of (12) on the open interval I if:
_x(t) = f(x(t));8t 2 I (13)
The initial value problem (ivp) for (12) is, then, stated as:
_x = f(x); x(t0) = x0 (14)
and a solution x(t) for (14) is referred to as a solution through x0 at t0. Denote
x(t) and x0, respectively, as:
'(t; x0)  x(t), and '(0; x0)  x0 (15)
where '(t; x0) is called the ow of _x = f(x):
20 In the denition of a dynamical system given below I am not striving to present the most
general version. The basic aim is to lead to an intuitive understanding of the denition of a
basin of attraction so that the main theorem is made reasonably transparent. Moreover, the
denition given below is for scalar ODEs, easily generalizable to the vector case.
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Denition 6 Dynamical System
If f is a C1 function (i.e., the set of all di¤erentiable functions with contin-
uous rst derivatives), then the ow '(t; x0);8t; induces a map of U @ R into
itself, called a C1 dynamical system on R:
x0 7 ! '(t; x0) (16)
if it satises the following (one-parameter group) properties:
1. '(0; x0) = x0
2. '(t + s; x0) = '(t; '(s; x0));8t & s; whenever both the l.h and r.h side
maps are dened;
3. 8t; '(t; x0) is a C1 map with a C1 inverse given by: '( t; x0);
Remark 7 A geometric way to think of the connection between a ow and the
induced dynamical system is to say that the ow of an ODE gives rise to a
dynamical system on R.
Remark 8 It is important to remember that the map of U @ R into itself
may not be dened on all of R. In this context, it might be useful to recall the
distinction between partial recursive functions and total functions in classical
recursion theory.
Denition 9 Invariant set
A set (usually compact) S @ U is invariant under the ow '(:; :) whenever
8t 2 R; '(:; :) @ S:
Denition 10 Attracting set
A closed invariant set A @ U is referred to as the attracting set of the
ow '(t; x) if 9 some neighbourhood V of A; s.t 8x 2 V & 8t  0; '(t; x) 2 V
and:
'(t; x)! A as t!1 (17)
Remark 11 It is important to remember that in dynamical systems theory con-
texts the attracting sets are considered the observable states of the dynamical
system and its ow.
Denition 12 The basin of attraction of the attracting set A of a ow, denoted,
say, by A, is dened to be the following set:
A = [t0't(V ) (18)
where: 't(:) denotes the ow '(:; :);8t:
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Remark 13 Intuitively, the basin of attraction of a ow is the set of initial
conditions that eventually leads to its attracting set - i.e., to its limit set (limit
points, limit cycles, strange attractors, etc). Anyone familiar with the denition
of a Turing Machine and the famous Halting problem for such machines would
immediately recognise the connection with the denition of basin of attraction
and suspect that my main result is obvious21 .
On the policy side, my formal assumption is that by policyis meant rules
and my obvious working hypothesis - almost a thesis, if not an axiom - is the
following:
Claim 14 Every rule is reducible to a recursive rule22
Remark 15 This claim and the results below are valid whether by rule is
meant an element from a set of preassigned rules (i.e., the notion of policy
as a xed rule in the rules vs. discretiondichotomy) or a rule as a (partial
recursive or total) function of the current state of the dynamics of a complex
economy (discretionary policy)23 .
Remark 16 If anyone can suggest a rule which cannot be reduced to a recursive
rule, it can only be due to an appeal to a non-algorithmic principle like an un-
decidable disjunction (which are routinely invoked in mathematical economics),
magic, ESP or something similar.
Denition 17 Dynamical Systems capable of Computation Universal-
ity:
A dynamical system capable of computation universality is one whose den-
ing initial conditions can be used to program and simulate the actions of any
arbitrary Turing Machine, in particular that of a Universal Turing Machine.
Proposition 18 Dynamical systems characterizable in terms of limit points,
limit cycles or chaoticattractors, called elementary attractors, are not capable
of universal computation.
Proposition 19 Only dynamical systems whose basins of attraction are poised
on the boundaries of elementary attractors are capable of universal computation.
Theorem 20 There is no e¤ective procedure to decide whether a given observ-
able trajectory is in the basin of attraction of a dynamical system capable of
computation universality
21 In the same sense in which the Walrasian Equilibrium Existence theorem is obvious for
anyone familiar with the Brouwer (or similar) xed point theorem(s). The nesse, however,
was to formalise the Walrasian economy topologically, in the rst place. A similar nesse is
required here.
22Firstly, recursive is meant to be interpreted in its recursion theoretic sense; secondly,
this claim is, in fact, a restatement of the Church-Turing Thesis (cf. [6], p.34).
23 It may be useful to keep in mind the following caveat introduced in one of the famous
papers on these matters by Kydland and Prescott ([24], p.169):
"[W]e emphasize that the choice is from a [xed] set of scal policy rules."
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Proof. The rst step in the proof is to show that the basin of attraction of a
dynamical system capable of universal computation is recursively enumerable
but not recursive. The second step, then, is to apply Rices theorem to the
problem of membership decidability in such a set.
First of all, note that the basin of attraction of a dynamical system capable
of universal computation is recursively enumerable. This is so since trajectories
belonging to such a dynamical system can be e¤ectively listed simply by trying
out, systematically, sets of appropriate initial conditions.
On the other hand, such a basin of attraction is not recursive. For, suppose
a basin of attraction of a dynamical system capable of universal computation
is recursive. Then, given arbitrary initial conditions, the Turing Machine corre-
sponding to the dynamical system capable of universal computation would be
able to answer whether (or not) it will halt at the particular conguration char-
acterising the relevant observed trajectory. This contradicts the unsolvability
of the Halting problem for Turing Machines.
Therefore, by Rices theorem, there is no e¤ective procedure to decided
whether any given arbitrary observed trajectory is in the basin of attraction
of such recursively enumerable but not recursive basin of attraction.
Given this result, it is clear that an e¤ective theory of policy is impossible
in a complex economy. Obviously, if it is e¤ectively undecidable to determine
whether an observable trajectory lies in the basin of attraction of a dynamical
system capable of computation universality, it is also impossible to devise a
policy - i.e., a recursive rule - as a function of the dening coordinates of such
an observed or observable trajectory. Just for the record I shall state it as a
formal proposition:
Proposition 21 An e¤ective theory of policy is impossible for a complex
economy
Remark 22 The impossibilitymust be understood in the context of e¤ectiv-
ity and that it does not mean specic policies cannot be devised for individual
complex economies. This is similar to the fact that non-existence of general
purpose algorithms for solving arbitrary Diophantine equations does not mean
specic algorithms cannot and have not been found for special, particular, such
equations.
What if the realized trajectory lies outside the basin of attraction of a dy-
namical system capable of computation universality and the objective of policy
is to drive the system to such a basin of attraction? This means the policy
maker is trying to design a dynamical system capable of computational univer-
sality with initial conditions pertaining to one that does not have that capability.
Or, equivalently, an attempt is being made, by the policy maker, to devise a
method by which to make a Finite Automaton construct a Turing Machine, an
impossibility. In other words, an attempt is being made endogenously to con-
struct a complex economyfrom a non-complex economy. Much of this e¤ort
is, perhaps, what is called development economics or transition economics
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and various principles of institution design are attempting the recursively im-
possible. Essentially, my claim is that it is recursively impossible to construct
a system capable of computation universality using only the dening character-
istics of a Finite Automaton. To put it more picturesquely, a non-algorithmic
step must be taken to go from systems incapable of self-organisation to ones
that are capable of it. This is why developmentand transitionare di¢ cult
issues to theorise about, especially for policy purposes. It must, however, be
remembered that this does not mean that the task is impossible in any absolute
sense. There may well be non-recursive methods to seek out the boundaries of
the equivalent of the basins of attractors of dynamical systems. There may also
be ad hoc means by which recursive methods may be discovered for such a task.
The above theorem seeks only to state that there are no general purpose e¤ective
methods for such a policy task. Hence the admonition by some of the pioneers
of economic theory - Hayek, above all - to be modest about policy proposals for
a complex economy may have been motivated by concerns about being conned
to by pseudo-mathematical economists, trained in one kind of convenient but
irrelevant mathematics.
I should emphasize that no reading of the above framework and results
justies the widespread belief that the new classical have made a formal case for
rules against discretion. The framework and results above make a case for an
enlightened approach to policy, where poetry and prose may well be the better
guides than one-dimensional mathematics.
Perhaps this is the reason for Hayeks lifelong scepticism on the scope for
policy in economies that emerge and form spontaneous orders! It is not for noth-
ing that Harrods growth path was on a knife-edge and Wicksells cumulative
process was a metastable dynamical system, located on the boundary dened
by the basins of attractions of two stable elementary dynamical systems (one
for the real economy, founded on a modied Austrian capital theory; the other
for a monetary macroeconomy underpinned by a pure credit system.)
When policy discussions resort to reliance on special economic models the
same unease that causes disquiet when special interests advocate policies should
be the outcome. Any number and kind of special dynamic economic models can
be devised to justify almost anything - all the way from policy nihilism, the
fashion of the day, to dogmatic insistence on rigid policies, justied on the basis
of seemingly sophisticated, essentially ad hoc, models. Equally, studying pat-
terns by simulating complex dynamical models and inferring structures, without
grounding them on the mathematics of the computer is a dangerous pastime.
A fortiori, suggesting policy measures on the basis of such inferred structures is
doubly dangerous. Nothing in the formalism of the mathematics underlying the
digital computer, the vehicle in which such investigations are conducted, and
simulations by it, justies formal inferences on implementable e¤ective policies.
Impossibility and undecidability results do not mean paralysis. Arrows im-
possibility theorem did not mean that democratic institution design was aban-
doned forever; Rabins powerful result that even though there are determined
classical games, it is not possible to devise e¤ective instructions to guide the
theoretical winner to implement a winning strategy has not meant that game
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theory cannot be a useful guide to policy. Similarly, the results above do not
mean that the poets in our profession cannot devise enlightened policies that
benet a complex economy. Perhaps the growth of the complexity of economies
calls forth more than intuition based on a thorough familiarity of the institutions
of an economy and its behavioural underpinnings. Neither poetry nor prose are
algorithmic endeavours - either in their creation or in their appreciation; nor is
policy, especially in a complex economy.
Justication for policy - either positively or negatively - cannot be sought
in mathematical formalisms. One must resort to poetry and classical political
economy, i.e., rely on imagination and compassion, for the visions of policies that
have to be carved out to make institutions locate themselves in those metastable
congurations that are dened by the boundaries in which dynamical systems
capable of universal computation get characterised.
4 Conning about Rational Expectations Equi-
librium and its Learning
In standard mathematical economics, topological xed-point theorems have been
used routinely to encapsulate and formalize self-reference (rational expecta-
tions and policy ine¤ectiveness), innite-regress (rational expectations) and self-
reproduction and self-reconstruction (growth), in economic dynamic contexts.
This is in addition to, and quite apart from, their widespread use in proving ex-
istence of equilibria in a wide variety of economic and game theoretical contexts.
The mathematical foundations of topology are, in general, sought in axiomatic
set theory. Set theory, however, is only one of four branches of mathematical
logic; the other three being, model theory, proof theory and recursion theory24 .
One can associate, roughly speaking, real analysis, non-standard analysis, con-
structive analysis and computable analysis with these four branches of math-
ematical logic. Economists, in choosing to formalize economic notions almost
exclusively in terms of real analysis, may not always succeed in capturing the in-
tended conceptual underpinnings of economic notions with the required delity.
My claim in this section is that the use of topological x point theorems to for-
malize rational expectations does not capture the two fundamental behavioural
notions that are crucial in its denition: self-reference and innite-regress. I
try, therefore, to reformalize the notion of rational expectations using a recur-
sion theoretic formalism such that fundamental theorems from this eld can be
invoked and utilized25 . The idea of self-referential behaviour is, for example,
formalized by considering the action of a program or an algorithm on its own
description. Innite regress is, of course, short-circuited, in the usual way, by a
x-point theorem.
Thus, I formalize the notion of Rational Expectations Equilibria, REE, re-
cursion theoretically, eschewing all topological assumptions. The emphasis is
24Some add the higher arithmetic (i.e., number theory ) as an independent fth branch of
modern mathematical logic.
25One of which is also called a x point theorem.
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on suggesting an alternative modelling strategy that can be mimicked for other
concepts and areas of economic theory. The implicit claim is that the dominance
of topological x-point theorems in mathematical economics was - indeed, is - a
particularly insidious con, perpetrated by the usual one-dimensional approach
to mathematics and mathematical logic by the mathematical economists.
All recursion theoretic formalizations and results come, almost invariably,
open ended- meaning, even when uniqueness results are demonstrated there
will be, embedded in the recesses of the procedures generating equilibria and
other types of solutions, an indeterminacy. This kind of indeterminacy is unfa-
miliar to economists with a mathematical bent simply because it is not common
in the mathematics of real analysis. These indeterminacies are due to the generic
result in computability theory, referred to and invoked in the previous section:
the Halting Problem for Turing Machines. It is a kind of generic undecidability
result, a counterpart to the more formal, and more famous, Gödelian unde-
cidability results. It is this fact that makes it possible to claim that seeking
economic theoretic foundations for policy may not be an easy task. To be cat-
egorical about policy - positively or negatively - on the basis of mathematical
models is a dangerous sport.
4.1 Background
In a critical discussion of the use of the Brouwer xed point theorem by Herbert
Simon, [48], that presaged its decisive use in what became the denition of a
rational expectations equilibrium, Karl Egil Aubert, a respected mathematician,
suggested that economists - and political scientists - were rather cavalier about
the domain of denition of economic variables and, hence, less than careful
about the mathematics they invoked to derive economic propositions. I was left
with the impression, after a careful reading of the discussion between Aubert
and Simon ([3], [49], [4] and [50]), that the issue was not the use of a xed point
framework but its nature, scope and underpinnings. However, particularly in
a rational expectations context, it is not only a question of the nature of the
domain of denition but also the fact that there are self-referential and innite-
regress elements intrinsic to the problem. This makes the appropriate choice
of the xed point theorem within which to embed the question of a rational
expectations equilibrium particularly sensitive to the kind of mathematics and
logic that underpins it. In this section I trace the origins of the topologisation
of the mathematical problem of rational expectations equilibrium and discuss
the possible infelicities inherent in such a formalization.
There are two crucial aspects to the notion of rational expectations equilib-
rium - henceforth, REE - ([42], pp.6-10): an individual optimization problem,
subject to perceived constraints, and a system wide, autonomous, set of con-
straints imposing consistency across the collection of the perceived constraints
of the individuals. The latter would be, in a most general sense, the accounting
constraint, generated autonomously, by the logic of the macroeconomic system.
In a representative agent framework the determination of REE s entails the solu-
tion of a general x point problem. Suppose the representative agents perceived
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law of motion of the macroeconomic system (as a function of state variables
and exogenous disturbances) as a whole is given by H26 . The system wide
autonomous set of constraints, implied, partially at least, by the optimal deci-
sions based on perceived constraints by the agents, on the other hand, imply an
actual law of motion given by, say, H0. The search for xed-points of a map-
ping, T , linking the individually perceived macroeconomic law of motion, H,
and the actual law of motion, H0 is assumed to be given by a general functional
relationship subject to the standard mathematical assumptions:
H0 = T (H) (19)
Thus, the xed-points of H of T 27 :
H = T (H) (20)
determine REEs.
What is the justication for T? What kind of objectis it? It is variously
referred to as a reaction function, a best response function, a best response
mapping, etc. But whatever it is called, eventually the necessary mathematical
assumptions are imputed to it such that it is amenable to a topological inter-
pretation whereby appeal can be made to the existence of a x-point for it as
a mapping from a structured domain into itself. So far as I know, there is no
optimizing economic theoretical justication for it.
There is also a methodological asymmetry in the determination of H and
H0, respectively. The former has a self-referential aspect to it; the latter an
innite regress element in it. Transforming, mechanically, the former into the
latter, hides this fact and reducing it to a topological xed-point problem does
little methodological justice to the contents of the constituent elements of the
problem. These elements are brought to the surface at a second, separate, step in
which ostensible learning mechanisms are devised, in ad hoc ways, to determine,
explicitly the uncomputable and non-constructive xed-points. But is it really
impossible to consider the twin problems in one fell swoop, so to speak?
This kind of tradition to the formalization and determination of REE s has
almost by default forced the problem into a particular mathematical straitjacket.
The mapping is given topological underpinnings, automatically endowing the
underlying assumptions with real analytic content28 . As a consequence of these
default ideas the problem of determining any REE is dichotomized into two
sub-problems: a rst part where non-constructive and non-computable proofs
of the existence of REE s are provided; and a subsequent, quite separate, second
part where mechanisms - often given the sobriquet learning mechanisms- are
devised to show that such REE s can be determined by individual optimizing
26Readers familiar with the literature will recognise that the notation H reects the fact
that, in the underlying optimisation problem, a Hamiltonian function has to be formed.
27 In a space of functions.
28 In the strict technical sense, as suggested above, of the mathematics of real analysis as
distinct from, say, constructive, computable or non-standard analysis.
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agents29 . It is in this second part where standard economic theory endows
agents with varieties of bounded rationalitypostulates, without modifying the
full rationality postulates of the underlying, original, individual optimization
problem.
Now, how did this topological xed-point REE tradition come into being?
Not, as might conceivably be believed, as a result of Muths justly celebrated
original contribution,[33], but from the prior work of Herbert Simon on a prob-
lem of predicting the behaviour of rational agents in a political setting, [48] and
an almost concurrent economic application by Franco Modigliani and Emile
Grunberg, [31]. Let me explain, albeit briey, to the extent necessary in the
context of this essay.30
Simon, in considering the general issue of the feasibility of public prediction
in a social science context, formalized the problem for the particular case of
investigating how the publication of an election prediction (particularly one
based on poll data) might inuence [individual] voting behaviour, and, hence -
... - falsify the prediction. Simon, as he has done so often in so many problem
situations, came up with the innovative suggestion that the self-referential and
innite-regress content of such a context may well be solved by framing it as a
mathematical xed-point problem:
"Is there not involved here a vicious circle, whereby any attempt
to anticipate the reactions of the voters alters those reactions and
hence invalidates the prediction?
In principle, the last question can be answered in the negative:
there is no vicious circle.
....
We [can prove using a classical theorem of topology due to
Brouwer (the xed-point theorem)] that it is always possible in
principle to take account of reactions to a published prediction in
such a way that the prediction will be conrmed by the event."
Simon, op.cit, [48], pp. 82-4; italics added.
29Perceptive readers may wonder whether there should not also be an optimization exercise
over the set of feasible or perceived learning mechanisms? Carried to its logical conclusion, this
would entail the determination of a set of REE s over the collection of learning mechanisms,
ad innitum (or ad nauseum, whichever one prefers).
30My aim is to show that the framing the REE problem as a topological xed-point prob-
lem was not necessary. Moreover, by forcing the REE problem as a topological xed-point
problem it became necessary to dichotomize into the proof of existence part and a separate
part to demonstrate the feasibility of constructing mechanisms to determine them. This is
mainly - but not only - due to the utilization of non-constructive or uncomputable topolog-
ical xed-point theorems in the rst, proof of REE existence, part. In this sense the REE
learning research program is very similar to the earlier dichotomizing of the general equilib-
rium problem. In that earlier phase, a long tradition of using topological xed-point theorem
to prove the existence of a economic equilibria was separated from devising constructive or
computable mechanisms to determine them. The later phase resulted in the highly successful
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models. It remains a melancholy fact, however, that
even after over forty years of sustained and impressive work on CGE models, they are neither
constructive nor computable, contrary to assertions by proponents of the theory (cf. [63] for
a rigorous demonstration of this claim).
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Grunberg and Modigliani recognized, clearly and explicitly, the self-referential
nature of the problem of consistent individually rational predictions in the face
of being placed in an economic environment where their predictions are reactions
to, and react upon (ad innitum  i.e., innite regress), the aggregate outcome,
but also were acutely aware of the technical di¢ culties of innite regress that
was inherent in such situations (cf., in particular, [31], p. 467 and p. 471). In
their setting an individual producer faced the classic problem of expected price
and quantity formation in a single market, subject to public prediction of the
market clearing price. It was not dissimilar to the crude cobweb model, as was
indeed recognized by them ([31], p.468, footnote 13). Interestingly, what even-
tually came to be called rational expectations by Muth was called a warranted
expectation31 by Grunberg and Modigliani (ibid, pp. 469-70). In any event,
their claim that it was normally possible to prove the existence of at least
one correct public prediction in the face of e¤ective reaction by the agentswas
substantiated by invoking Brouwers Fixed Point Theorem (ibid, p. 472). To
facilitate the application of the theorem, the constituent functions32 and vari-
ables - in particular, the reaction function and the conditions on the domain
of denition of prices - were assumed to satisfy the necessary real number and
topological conditions (continuity, boundedness, etc).
Thus it was that the tradition, in the rational expectations literature of solv-
ingthe conundrums of self-reference and innite-regress via topological xed-
point theorems was etched in the collective memory of the profession. And
so, four decades after the Simon and the Grunberg-Modigliani contributions,
Sargent, in his inuential Arne Ryde Lectures ([42]) was able to refer to the
xed-point approach to rational expectations, referring to equation (20), above:
"A rational expectations equilibrium is a xed point of the map-
ping T ."
[42], p.10.
Now, fty years after that initial introduction of the topological xed-point
tradition by Simon and Grunberg-Modigliani, economists automatically and un-
critically accept that this is the only way to solve the REE existence problem
31 I am reminded that Phelps, in one of his early papers introducing the concept of the
natural rate of unemployment in its modern forms ([35]), rst referred to it as a warranted
rate. Eventually, of course, the Wicksellian term natural rate, introduced by Friedman, pre-
vailed. Phelps and Grunberg-Modigliani were, presumably, inuenced by Harrodian thoughts
in choosing the eminently suitable word warrantedrather than naturalor rational, respec-
tively. Personally, for aesthetic as well as reasons of economic content, I wish the Phelps and
Grunberg-Modigliani suggestions had prevailed.
32The relation between a market price and its predicted value was termed the reaction
function : "Relations of this form between the variable to be predicted and the prediction will
be called reaction functions." ([31], p.471; italics in original).
As became the tradition in the whole rational expectations literature, the functional form
for the reaction functions were chosen with a clear eye on the requirements for the applica-
tion of an appropriate topological xed-point theorem. The self-reference and innite-regress
underpinnings were thought to have been adequately subsumed in the existence results that
were guaranteed by the xed-point solution. That the twin conundrums were not subsumed
but simply camouaged was not to become evident till all the later activity on trying to devise
learning processes for identifying REE s.
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- and they are not to be blamed. They have been conned for so long, and
bamboozled, too, by the ubiquity of xed-point theorems in economic theory
that yet another application to a domain of economic theory causes no apparent
dissonance, cognitive or otherwise. After all, the same somnambulent compla-
cency, equally due to conning by one-eyed mathematical economists, dominates
the fundamentals of general equilibrium theory, as if the equilibrium existence
problem can only be framed as a xed-point solution. Because of this compla-
cency, the existence problem has forever been severed of all connections with the
problem of determining - or nding or constructing or locating - the processes
that may lead to the non-constructive and uncomputable equilibrium.
On the other hand, the recursion theoretic xed-point tradition not only
preserves the unity of equilibrium existence demonstration with the processes
that determine it; but it also retains, in the forefront, the self-referential and
innite-regress aspects of the problem of the interaction between individual and
social prediction and individual and general equilibrium.
4.2 Recursion Theoretic Formalisms
There is nothing sacrosanct about a topological interpretation of the operator
T , the reaction or response function. It could equally well be interpreted re-
cursion theoretically, which is what I shall do in the sequel33 . I need some
unfamiliar, but elementary, formal machinery  concepts, denitions, new or
alternative connotations for familiar words, etc., not normally available to the
mathematical economist.
Denition 23 An operator is a function:
 : Fm  ! Fn (21)
where Fk (k = 1) is the class of all partial (recursive) functions from Nk to
N.
Denition 24  is a recursive operator if there is a computable function 
such that 8f 2 Fm and x 2 Nm, y 2 N :
 (f) (x) ' y iff 9 a finite  v f such that 
e;x ' y
where34 e is a standard coding of a nite function ; which is extended by
f .
33 I have relied on the following four excellent texts for the formalisms and results of recursion
theory that I am using in this part of the essay: [10], [11], [29] and [39].
34 If f (x) and g (x) are expressions involving the variables x =(x1; x2; :::::; xk), then:
f (x) ' g (x)
means: for any x, f (x) and g (x) are either both dened or undened, and if dened, they
are equal.
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Denition 25 An operator  : Fm  ! Fn is continuous if, for any f 2 Fm;
and 8x; y:
 (f) (x) ' y iff 9 a finite  v f such that  () (x) ' y
Denition 26 An operator  : Fm  ! Fn is monotone if, whenever f; g 2
Fm and f v g, then  (f) v  (g) :
Theorem 27 A recursive operator is continuous and monotone.
Example 28 Consider the following recursive program, Þ ,(also a recursive
operator) over the integers:
Þ: F (x; y)(= if x = y then y + 1, else F (x; F (x  1; y + 1))
Now replace each occurrence of F in Þ by each of the following functions:
f1 (x; y) : if x = y then y + 1; else x+ 1 (22)
f2 (x; y) : if x = y then x+ 1; else y   1 (23)
f3 (x; y) : if (x = y) ^ (x  y even) then x+ 1; else undefined: (24)
Then, on either side of (= in Þ, we get the identical partial functions:
8i (1 5 i 5 3) ; fi (x; y)  if x = y then y = 1; else fi (x  1; y + 1) (25)
Such functions fi (8i (1 5 i 5 3)) are referred to as xed-points of the re-
cursive program Þ (recursive operator).
Note that these are xed-points of functionals.
Remark 29 Note that f3, in contrast to f1 and f2, has the following special
property. 8hx; yi of pairs of integers such that f3 (x; y) is dened, both f1 and
f2 are also dened and have the same value as does f3.
 f3 is, then, said to be less dened than or equal to f1 and f2 and this
property is denoted by f3 v f1 and f3 v f2:
 In fact, in this particular example, it so happens that f3 is less dened
than or equal to all xed points of Þ.
 In addition, f3 is the only partial function with this property for Þ and
is, therefore called the least xed point of Þ.
We now have the minimal formal machinery needed to state one of the classic
theorems of recursive function theory, known variously as the rst recursion
theorem, Kleenes theorem or, sometimes, as the xed point theorem for complete
partial orders.
Theorem 30 Suppose that  : Fm  ! Fm is a recursive operator (or a recur-
sive program Þ). Then there is a partial function f that is the least xed point
of  :
 (f) = f;
If  (g) = g, then f v g:
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Remark 31 If, in addition to being partial, f is also total, then it is the
unique least xed point. Note also that a recursive operator is characterized
by being continuous and monotone. There would have been some advantages in
stating this famous theorem highlighting the domain of denition, i.e., complete
partial orders, but the formal machinery becomes slightly unwieldy.
Remark 32 Although this way of stating the (rst) recursion theorem almost
highlights its non-constructive aspect  i.e., the theorem guarantees the exis-
tence of a x-point without indicating a way of nding it it is possible to use
a slightly stronger form of the theorem to amend this defect(cf. [32], p.59).
4.3 Recursion Theoretic REE
Before stating formally, as a summarizing theorem, the main result (i.e., theorem
33, below) it is necessary to formalize the rational agent and the setting in
which rationality is exercised in the expectational domain in recursion theoretic
formalisms, too. This means, at a minimum, the rational agent as a recursion
theoretic agent35 .
The topological x-point theorems harnessed by a rational agent are, as
mentioned previously, easily done in standard economic theory where the agents
themselves are set-theoretically formalized. There is no dissonance between the
formalism in which the rational agent is dened and the economic setting in
which such an agent operates. The latter setting is also set theoretically dened.
The recursion theoretic formalism introduced in the previous sub-section
presupposes that the rational agent is now recursion theoretically dened and
so too the setting - i.e., the economy. Dening the rational agent recursion
theoretically means dening the preferences characterizing the agent and the
choice theoretic actions recursion theoretically. This means, rstly, dening the
domain of choice for the agent number theoretically and, secondly, the choice
of maximal (sub)sets over such a domain in a computably viable way. Such a
redenition and reformalization should mean equivalences between the rational
choice of an agent over well dened preferences and the computing activities of
an ideal computer, i.e., Turing Machine (or any of its own formal equivalences,
by the Church-Turing Thesis). Since a complete formalism and the relevant
equivalences are described, dened and, where necessary, rigorously proved in
Chapter 3 of my Ryde Lectures ([59]), I shall simply assume the interested reader
can be trusted to refer to it for any detailed clarication and substantiation.
It is now easy to verify that the domain over which the recursive operator
and the partial functions are dened are weaker36 than the conventional domains
35This should not cause any disquiet in expectational economics, at least not to those of
us who have accepted the Lucasian case for viewing agents as signal processors who use
optimal lters in their rational decision processing activities (cf. [28], p.9). Agents as signal
processorsis only a special variant of being optimal computing units.
36They are weaker in a very special sense. A domain of denition that is number theo-
retically dened  i.e., over only the rational or the natural numbers  rather than over the
whole of the real number system pose natural diophantine and combinatorial conundrums
that cannot easily be resolved by the standard operators of optimization.
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over which the economist works. Similarly, the continuity and monotonicity of
the recursive operator is naturally satised by the standard assumptions in
economic theory for the reaction or response function, T . Hence, we can apply
the rst recursion theorem to equation (2), interpreting T as a recursive operator
and not as a topological mapping. Then, from theorem 8, we know that there is
a partial function - i.e., a computable function - ft that is the least xed point
of T . Thus, we can summarize the desired result in the form of the following
theorem:
Theorem 33 Suppose that the reaction or response function, T : Hm  ! Hm
is a recursive operator (or a recursive program  ). Then there is a computable
function ft that is a least xed point of T :
T (ft) = ft;
If T (g) = g, then ft v g
Remark 34 Theorem 33 can be used directly to show that 9 a (recursive) pro-
gram that, under any input, outputs exactly itself. It is this program that acts
as the relevant reaction or response function for an economy in REE. The
existence of such a recursive program justies the Newclassical methodological
stand on the ubiquity of rational expectations equilibria. However, since theo-
rem 33 is stated above in its non-constructive version, nding this particular
recursive program requires a little e¤ort. Hence, the need for learning processes
to nd this program, unless the theorem is utilized in its constructive version.
Even with these caveats, the immediate advantage is that there is no need to
deal with non-recursive reals or non-computable functions in the recursion the-
oretic formalism. In the traditional formalism the x-point that is the REE is,
except for ukes, a non-recursive real; constructing learning processes to de-
termine non-recursive reals is either provably impossible or formally intractable
(computationally complex).
What are the further advantages of recasting the problem of solving for the
REE recursion theoretically rather than retaining the traditional topological
formalizations?
An advantage at the supercial level but nevertheless not unimportant in
policy oriented economic theoretic contexts is the simple fact that, as even the
name indicates, recursion encapsulates, explicitly, the idea of self-reference be-
cause functions are dened, naturally, in terms of themselves. Secondly the
existence of a least x point is a solution to the innite-regress problem. Thus
the two birdsare encapsulated in one fell swoop - and, that too, with a com-
putable function.
Think of the formal discourse of economic analysis as being conducted in
a programming language; call it =. We know that we choose the underlying
terminology for economic formalisms with particular meanings in mind for the
elemental units: preferences, endowments, technology, information, expectation
and so on; call the generic element of the set &. When we form a compound eco-
nomic proposition out of the & units, the meaning is natural and clear. We can,
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therefore, suppose that evaluating a compound expression in = is immediate:
given an expression in =, say  (&), the variables in , when given specic values
, are to be evaluated according to the semantics of =. To actually evaluate
a compound expression,  (&) ; we write a recursive program in the language =,
the language of economic theory.
But that leaves a key question unanswered: what is the computable function
that is implicitly dened by the recursive program? The rst recursion theorem
answers this question with the answer: the least xed-point. In this case, there-
fore, there is a direct application of the rst recursion theorem to the semantics
of the language =. The articial separation between the syntax of economic
analysis, when formalized, and its natural semantics can, therefore, be bridged
e¤ectively.
If the language of economic theory is best regarded as a very high level
programming language, =, to understand a theorem in economics, in recursion
theoretic terms, represent the assumptions - i.e., axioms and the variables -
as input data and the conclusions as output data. State the theorem as an
expression in the language =:Then try to convert the proof into a program in
the language =, which will take in the inputs and produce the desired output.
If one is unable to do this, it is probably because the proof relies essentially
on some infusion of non-constructive or uncomputable elements. This step will
identify any inadvertent infusion of non-algorithmic reasoning, which will have
to be resolved - sooner or later, if computations are to be performed on the
variables as input data. The computations are not necessarily numerical; they
can also be symbolic.
In other words, if we take algorithms and data structures to be funda-
mental,then it is natural to dene and understand functions in these terms. If a
function does not correspond to an algorithm, what can it be? The topological
denition of a function is not naturally algorithmic. Therefore, the expressions
formed from the language of economic theory, in a topological formalization, are
not necessarily implementable by a program, except by ukes, appeal to magic
or by illegitimate, intractable and vague approximations. Hence the need to
dichotomize every topological existence proof. In the case of REE, this is the
root cause of the articial importance granted to a separate problem of learning
REE s.
In all of these - and many more - senses, the REE and its learning literature
are noble purveyors of indiscriminate conning.
5 Concluding Notes
"The human mind is not a purely logical entity. The complex
manner in which it functions is often at variance with the logic of
mathematics. It is not always pure logic which gives us insight, nor is
it chance that causes us to make mistakes. To understand how these
processes occur, both successfully and erroneously, we must formu-
late a distinction between the mathematical concepts as formally
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dened and the cognitive processes by which they are conceived."
Tall and Vinner ([58], p.151; italics added)
What guarantee is there, then, that economic concepts can be mapped un-
ambiguously and surjectively - to be terribly and unnecessarily mathematical
about it - into mathematical concepts? The belief in the power and necessity
of formalizing economic theory mathematically has thus obliterated the distinc-
tion between cognitively perceiving and understanding concepts from di¤erent
domains and mapping them into each other. Whether the age-old problem of
the equality between supply and demand should be mathematically formalized
as a system of inequalities or equalities is not something that should be decided
by mathematical knowledge or convenience. Surely it would be considered ab-
surd, bordering on the insane, if a surgical procedure was implemented because
a tool for its implementation was devised by a medical doctor who knew and
believed in topological xed point theorems? Yet, weighty propositions about
policy are decided on the basis of formalizations based on ignorance and belief
in the veracity of one kind of one-dimensional mathematics.
5.1 A Mathematical Excursion
Thus, consider Hildenbrands attempt at characterizing an axiomatic theory of
a certain economic phenomenon as formulated by Debreu([13]). This attempt
leads to two precepts for formalizing in economics:
"First, the primitive concepts of the economic analysis are se-
lected, and then, each of these primitive concepts is represented by
a mathematical object.
....
Second, assumptions on the mathematical representations of the
primitive concepts are made explicit and are fully specied. Mathe-
matical analysis then establishes the consequences of these assump-
tions in the form of theorems."
ibid, p.4; italics added.
Even if we grant Hildenbrand the rst precept, accepting orthodox charac-
terizations of the primitive concepts of economic analysis, there are a variety
of mathematics, each with di¤erent kinds of mathematical object, onto which
these can be mapped. Surely, many economic concepts are naturally combina-
torial. The mapping from such combinatorial primitive concepts of economics
to an appropriate mathematics is, even at the simplest level, as di¤erent as ordi-
nary linear programming as against integer programming. One cannot solve an
equivalentlinear programming problem, dening economic variables to range
over the reals and, then, approximate the solution to the integer programming
problem by taking the nearest integer solution to the real solution of the linear
programming problem. Non-standard mathematical analysis is quite comfort-
able with innitesimal objects. Constructive mathematics does not accept the
Church-Turing thesis and, hence, the nature and scope of allowable algorithms
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is signicantly di¤erent from those accepted in recursion theory, which accepts
the Church-Turing thesis. The Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem is invalid in con-
structive analysis; the Heine-Borel theorem has no counterpart in Computable
analysis. And so on.
Nor is it the case that the mathematical analysiswhich then establishes
the consequences of these assumptions in the form of theoremsindependent of
the nature of the mathematical objects and the logic of mathematical reasoning
allowed in that particular mathematical analysis. In most forms of Constructive
mathematics undecidable disjunctions are eschewed, particularly when they are
implications of invoking the tertium non datur.
Let me give a famous example from the very heart of number theory, which
in its conception and formulation is also elementary: the prime number theorem.
I choose this example to illustrate the fact that the nature of the mathemati-
cal object, in this case ordinary numbers, about which a conjecture was made
belongs to one particular type of mathematics, i.e., number theory; but the
conjecture itself belongs to a di¤erent kind of mathematics, i.e., analysis, and
its proof, therefore, was sought after in the latter branch of mathematics.
The saga that led to what I like to call the prime number nut began with
the famous conjectures, independently made, by Euler, Legendre and Gauss
that (x), the number of primes less than x, approaches, asymptotically, the
quotient Xlog x , or:
lim
z!1
(x)
x= log x
= 1 (26)
As Shanks ([46], p.16; last italics in original)) observed perceptively:
"No easy proof of the [prime number theorem] is known. The
fact that it took a century to prove is a measure of its di¢ culty. The
theorem is primarily one of analysis. Number theory plays only a
small role. That some analysis must enter is clear from [the above
equation]  a limit is involved. The extent to which analysis is
involved is what is surprising."
But surely recognising that the object about which the conjecture was made
was combinatorial and, therefore, techniques of proof belonging to some variant
of combinatorial mathematics may well result in a proof that was as simple as
it was to state the conjecture? Consider, therefore, the following proof of a
bound for (x). denote by pi (8i = 1; ::::;m), those prime numbers less than
the number x: Then:
x = pe11 :p
e2
2 : ::::::p
em
m (27)
Clearly each exponent is at most log x; i.e.,
ei  log x 8i = 1; ::::;m (28)
Thus each ei can be e¤ectively37 encoded by at most log log x bits. On the
other hand, a fundamental result in algorithmic complexity theory shows that
37Of course e¤ ectivity in the strict mathematical sense of recursion theory.
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maximally complex numbers x cannot be encoded by less than log x bits; i.e.,
(x)  log x
log log x
(29)
This (provably simpler) proof presupposes some elementary knowledge of
algorithmic complexity theory which, in turn, presupposes some further elemen-
tary grounding in classical recursion theory. But the proverbial buck stops there;
the basis is computable and combinatorial and hence entirely consistent with the
nature of the mathematical object, about which the conjecture was originally
made. In the proof - called proof by the incompressibility method -itself I have,
implicitly, exploited the fact that we can assume most numbers to be maximally
descriptively complex (in a precise sense). Then the required contradiction is
obtained by supposing that such a number can be (e¤ectively) encoded by ex-
ploiting extractable algorithmic patterns. The key mehtodological di¤erence
between proof by the incompressible method and traditionalformalistic proofs
(particularly existence and lower-upper bound proofs) is best described by Li
and Vitanyi, the most polished exponents and expositors of the incompressible
method:
"Traditional proofs often involve all instances of a problem in
order to conclude that some property holds for at least one instance.
The proof would have proceeded simpler, if only that one instance
could have been used in the rst place. Unfortunately, that instance
is hard or impossible to nd, and the proof has to involve all the
instances. In contrast, in a proof by the incompressibility method,
we rst choose a random (that is, incompressible) individual object
that is known to exist 9even though we cannot construct it). Then
we show that if the assumed property would not hold, then this
object could be compressed, and hence it would not be random"
Li and Vitanyi ([27], p.4)
In the above (sketch of the) proof I have exploited the incompressibility of
most numbers by selecting a typical x, and the selection process is e¤ective ,
i.e., no metaphysical choice axioms need be invoked at any stage of the demon-
stration. This remark leads me on to my next point regarding the ubiquity of
the axiom of choice in the activities of the mathematical economist. But before
that, to continue and close the thread of reasoning involved with the exam-
ple of the prime number theorem and its proof, let me remind the reader of a
wise observation made by Clower and Howitt ([8]) in the context of monetary
theory with entirely obvious rational number constraints on the domain of tra-
ditional supply-demand variables. Clower and Howitt pointed out that proofs
of propositions in monetary theory with rational number constraints:
"[N]ecessarily involve the use of number theory a branch of math-
ematics unfamiliar to most economists."
ibid, p. 452.
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This perceptive observation and the kind of mathematics I used to prove
quite simply the prime number theorem are reminders of the fact that the
economic problemis not naturally to be viewed (always) necessarily from the
point of view of classical mathematical analysis; nor need propositions have
(always) to be proved by analytical methods. The more substantive examples
in the main body of the paper are illustrations of these precepts and, therefore,
highlight the problem of the ontology of economic concepts and entities and
their unambiguous mapping into mathematical domains.
Then, there is the ubiquity of the axiom of choice in the activity of the
mathematical economist and the way it cons us into somnambulance is far more
sinister in many ways than even the blind use of xed point theorems and
reliance on classical mathematical analysis for formalizations. Each time an
article or a text in economic analysis contains the unguarded assertion that
agents are indexed over the continuum, and a particular representative agent
is identied, there is an implicit reliance on, and explicit invoking of, the axiom
of choice38 .
Economically evocative descriptive terms and concepts such as choice sets,
selectors, etc., are associated with the use of this axiom in economics, partic-
ularly in discussions about the foundations of rational choice. How do mathe-
matical economists who appreciate its formal power justify its use in deriving
economic propositions despite its blatant violation of any implemental choice?
Not, as one may expect, on the basis of the intuitive richness of its implications;
but, peculiarly, on its apparent acceptance by mathematicians:
"The proof of [Szpilrajns theorem on the existence of an extension
that is an ordering] requires an auxiliary proposition called Zorns
lemma [that] is not intuitively clear, but it is demonstrably
equivalent to an important axiom of choice that is accepted today
by most mathematicians."
Suzumura ([57], pp. 16-7; bold emphasis added)
Have we been reduced to accepting mathematical axioms also on the basis of
the simple majority rule? Are we, as economists, supposed to accept the use of a
controversial axiom, to put it mildly, to derive important economic propositions,
simply on the basis that is accepted today by most mathematicians? Even if
38 I had the melancholy privilege of listening to a seminar given by a Senior colleague of
mine, at the University of Trento, where all sorts of silly assumptions about a continuum of
agents were made. When I pointed out to him that it was, in fact, not necessary for him to
assume a continuum, but that a countable innity of agents would su¢ ce, his response was:
But others using this kind of model assume a continuum of agents! In exasperation I nally
had to write him as follows (in a letter dated 17 June 2003) :
"You cannot start with a continuum assumption and restrict the simulation
model to 10 or 20 or 1020 or any number of nite agents; the answers will not
correspond to the solution given by the model, except by uke, and even then
one will not be any wiser in an analytical sense.
Economists do this all the time ......."
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we, again as economists, grant this should we not wonder why it was necessary,
in the rst place, for mathematicians and mathematical logicians to formulate
such an axiom and, often, to be quite explicit about actually appealing to it -
much more than the half-baked mathematical economists who more often than
not do not even realise they are using it and its dubious underpinnings and
implications39?
5.2 An Excursion into Game Theory
An important sub-eld of mathematical economics that I have not dealt with
must be mentioned in this context of comments about the invoking of the ax-
iom of choice: Game theory, a theory which is also heavily dependent, even
historically, on the use of xed point theorems40 .
In the case of game theory the subversion into its subjective vision of eco-
nomic behaviour in adversarial situations was a direct consequence of the xed
point approach pioneered by von Neumann and Nash. I think I can make a
strong case to substantiate this assertion and, thus, provide a further example
of economists and social scientists being conned into a particular vision of eco-
nomic, social and political processes41 . My starting point would be Zermelos
celebrated lecture of 1912 ([68]) and his pioneering formulation of an adversarial
situation into an alternating game and its subsequent formulation and solution
as a mini-max problem by Jan Mycielski in terms of alternating the existential
and universal quantiers.
The Zermelo game has no subjective component of any sort. It is an entirely
objective game of perfect information, although it is often considered part of
the orthodox game theoretic tradition. Let me describe the gist of the kind of
game considered by Zermelo, rst. In a 2-player game of perfect information,
alternative moves are made by the two players, say A and B. The game, say
as in Chess, is played by each of the players movingone of a nite number of
counters available to him or her, according to specied rules, along a tree- in
the case of Chess, of course, on a board of xed dimension, etc. Player A, say,
makes the rst move (perhaps determined by a chance mechanism) and places
one of the counters, say a0 2 A0; on the designated tree at some allowable
position (again, for evocative purposes, say as in Chess or any other similar
board game); player B, then, observes the move made by A - i.e., observes, with
perfect recall, the placement of the counter a1 - and makes the second move by
39Kuratowski and Mostowski, whose monumental text on Set Theory ([23]) is often invoked
by mathematical economists, alert the reader each time a theorem is established using the
axiom of choice. This is not the only classic mathematical or mathematical logic text to do
so. Would that economists could also be knowledgeable and sensitive enough to do so!
40 In fact, in a sense, the Arrow-Debreu formalization borrowedthe xed point approach
from Nash. But I am not writing a history of mathematical economics, however much such
an approach would be the ideal way to discuss all the cons and conning I am interested in.
That must wait for a di¤erent exercise.
41 In direct analogy with the kind of observation made by Steve Smale about transforming an
intrinsic equation approach to the problem of supply-demand equilibrium to one of inequalities
formulated as xed point problems.
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placing, say b1 2 B1; on an allowable position on the board; and so on. Let us
suppose these alternating choices terminate after Player Bs n   th move; i.e.,
when bn 2 Bn has been placed in an appropriate place on the board.
Denition 35 A play of such a game consists of a sequence of such alternative
moves by the two players
Suppose we label the alternating individual moves by the two players with
the natural numbers in such a way that:
1. The even numbers, say, a(0); a(2); :::::; a(n 1) enumerate player As moves;
2. The odd numbers, say, b(1); b(3); :::::::; b(n) enumerate player Bs moves;
 Then, each (nite) play can be expressed as a sequence, say , of
natural numbers.
Suppose we dene the set  as the set of plays which are wins for player A;
and, similarly, the set  as the set of plays which are wins for player B.
Denition 36 A strategy is a function from any (nite) string of natural num-
bers as input generates a single natural number, say , as an output.
Denition 37 A game is determined if one of the players has a winning
strategy; i.e., if either  2  or  2 .
Theorem 38 Zermelos Theorem: 9 a winning strategy for player A, whatever
is the play chosen by B; and vice versa for B
Remark 39 This is Zermelos version of a minimax theorem in a perfect recall,
perfect information, game.
It is in connection with this result and the minimax form of it that Steinhaus
observed, with considerable perplexity:
"[My] inability [to prove the minimax theorem] was a consequence
of the ignorance of Zermelos paper ([68]) in spite of its having been
published in 1913. .... J von Neumann was aware of the impor-
tance of the minimax principle (cf. [65]); it is, however, di¢ cult
to understand the absence of a quotation of Zermelos lecture in his
publications."
Steinhaus ([55], p. 460; italics added)
Why didnt von Neumann refer, in 1928, to the Zermelo-tradition of alter-
nating games? The tentative answer to such a question is a whole research
program in itself and I will simply have to place it on an agenda and pass
on. I have no doubts whatsoever that any serious study to answer this almost
rhetorical question will reap a rich harvest of further cons perpetrated by the
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mathematical economists, perhaps inadvertently. The point I wish to make is
something else and has to do with the axiom of choice and its place in economic
conning. So, let me return to this theme.
Mycielski (cf., [55], pp. 460-1) formulated the Zermelo minimax theorem in
terms of alternating logical quantiers as follows42 :


[
a02A0
\
b12B1
::::::::: [
an2An 1
\
bn2Bn
(a0b1a2b3:::::an 1bn)

2 
=)

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
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Now, summarizing the structure of the game and taking into account My-
cielskis formulation in terms of alternating we can state as follows:
1. The sequential moves by the players can be modelled by alternating exis-
tential and universal quantiers.
2. The existential quantier moves rst; if the total number of moves is odd,
then an existential quantier determines the last chosen integer; if not,
the universal quantier determines the nal integer to be chosen.
3. One of the players tries to make a logical expression, preceded by these
alternating quantiers true; the other tries to make it false.
4. Thus, inside the braces the win condition in any play is stated as a propo-
sition to be satised by generating a number belonging to a given set.
5. If, therefore, we can extract an arithmetical form - since we are dealing
with sequences of natural numbers - for the win condition it will be possible
to discuss recursive solvability, decidability and computability of winning
strategies.
The above denitions, descriptions and structures dene, therefore, an Arith-
metical Game of length n (cf. [59], pp. 125-6 for a formal denition). Stating
the Zermelo theorem in a more formal and general form, we have:
Theorem 40 Arithmetical Games of nite length are determined.
The more general theorem, for games of arbitrary (non-nite) length, can
be proved by standard diagonalization arguments and is43 :
Theorem 41 Arithmetical Games on any countable set or on any set which
has a countable complement is determined.
42Readers who are knowledgeable about mathematical logic - particularly recursion, proof
and model theories - will recognise, in this formulation, the way Gödel derived undecidable
sentences.
43The real time paradox of implementing an innite play is easily resolved (cf., [55], pp.
465; [59], chapter 7).
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Now, enter the axiom of choice! Suppose we allow any unrestricted sets  and
: Then, for example if they are imperfect sets44 , the game is not determined. If
we work within ZFC, then such sets are routinely acceptable and lead to games
that cannot be determined - even if we assume perfect information and perfect
recall. Surely, this is counter-intuitive? For this reason, this tradition in game
theory chose to renounce the axiom of choice and work with an alternative axiom
that restricts the class of sets within which arithmetical games are played. The
alternative axiom is the axiom of determinacy, introduced by Steinhaus:
Axiom 42 The Axiom of Determinacy: Arithmetical Games on every sub-
set of the Baire line45 is determined.
The motivation given by Steinhaus ([55], pp. 464-5) is a salutary lesson
for mathematically minded economists or economists who choose to accept the
axiom of choice on democraticprinciples or economists who are too lazy to
study carefully the economic meaning of accepting a mathematical axiom:
"It is known that [the Axiom of Choice] produces such conse-
quences as the decomposition of a ball into ve parts which can be
put together to build up a new ball of twice the volume of the old
one [the Banach-Tarski paradox], a result considered as paradoxical
by many scientists. There is another objection: how are we to speak
of perfect information for [players] A and B if it is impossible to
verify whether both of them think of the same set when they speak
of [""]? This impossibility is inherent in every set having only [the
Axiom of Choice] as its certicate of birth. In such circumstances it
is doubtful whether human beings will ever play really [an innite
game].
All these considerations impelled me to place the blame on the
Axiom of Choice. Sixty years of the theory of sets have elapsed since
this Axiom was proclaimed, and some ideas have .... convinced me
that a purely negative attitude against [the Axiom of Choice] would
be dangerous to propose. Thus I have chosen the idea of replacing
[the Axiom of Choice] by the [above Axiom of Determinacy].
italics added.
There is a whole tradition of game theory, beginning at the beginning, so to
speak, with Zermelo, linking up, via Rabins modication of the Gale-Stewart
innite game, to recursion theoretic formulations of arithmetical games under-
pinned by the axiom of determinacy and completely independent of the axiom
of choice and eschewing all subjective considerations. In this tradition
notions of e¤ective playability, solvability and decidability questions take on
fully meaningful computational and computable form where one can investi-
gate whether it is feasible to instruct a player, who is known to have a winning
44A set F is a perfect set if it is a closed set in which every point is a limit point.
45A Baire line is an irrational line which, in turn, is a line obtainable from a continuum by
removing a countable dense subset.
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strategy, to actually select a sequence to achieve the win. None of this is possi-
ble in the orthodox tradition, which cons us into a somnambulance that there
are no alternative mathematics for investigating, mathematically, adversarial
situations in the social sciences.
5.3 A Very Brief Note on Macrodynamics
In macrodynamics, the current frontiers seem to be dominated by the new clas-
sicals who have gradually begun to refer to this sub-discipline as Recursive
Macroeconomics46 . Their vision for the nature and future of macroeconomics, a
eld in which computation and dynamics is almost intrinsic to its problems, is
best reected in the way the subject is characterised by a leading proponent, a
Nobel Laureate of recent years47 , along the lines of the predominance of tools
in determining the nature of the subject48 :
"... I want to emphasize that the methodology that transformed
macroeconomics is applicable to the study of virtually all elds of
economics. In fact, the meaning of the word macroeconomics has
changed to refer to the tools being used49 rather than just to the
study of business cycle uctuations."
46Recursive, because the tools used to formalize macroeconomic concepts and entities are
determined by the mathematics of: Markov Decision Processes (Wald), Dynamic Program-
ming (Bellman) and (Kalman) Filtering, all of which have a recursivestructure. The reader
should be warned that recursivein this sense has nothing whatsoever to do with recursion
theoryin any sense whatsoever.
47He goes even further when he points out, pungently and frankly:
"What I am going to describe for you is a revolution in Macroeconomics,
a transformation in methodology that has reshaped how we conduct our sci-
ence. Prior to the transformation, macroeconomics was largely separate from
the rest of economics. Indeed, some considered the study of macroeconomics
fundamentally di¤erent and thought there was no hope of integrating macroeco-
nomics with the rest of economics, that is, with neoclassical economics. Others
held the view that neoclassical foundations for the empirically determined macro
relations would in time be developed. Neither view has proved correct."
Prescott ([38])
Of course, Prescott does not recognise the existence of non- neo classical economics; some-
times not even varieties of neo classical economics ([37]).
48 I cannot resist the temptation to add, as a counter-weight to this sanguine view a trenchant
observation made by a previous Nobel Laureate, who may not have been unsympathetic to
the new classicals, when he reviewed the classic of an earlier generation, Paul Samuelsons
Foundations of Economic Analysis ([?], p. 605):
"... [W]ho can know what tools we need unless he knows the material on which
they will be used."
49Prescott is, of course, referring to mathematical and computational tools. He does not
realise that the mathematical framework in which his theories are couched is intrinsically
uncomputable and non-constructive. In fact, the Prescott-Kydland research program, apart
from resting on Lucasian foundations, is also underpinned by the framework of computable
general equilibrium theory. Neither the practitioners of CGE nor the second-hand followers
have ever investigated whether CGE models are actually constructive or computable. In fact
they are neither (cf.,[63] )
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Prescott ([37]; second set of italics, added)
Moreover, as far as the New Classicals are concerned, the mathematical
foundations of neo classical economics is provided by general equilibrium the-
ory (and, occasionally, game theory). Since their foundations are in orthodox
general equilibrium theory - i.e., neoclassical microeconomics - there is no spe-
cial reason for me to identify the cons that we are subject to, at their hands:
they will be the same ones that emanate from the issues discussed in earlier
sections of this paper, on dynamics, policy and REE. On the other hand, the
new classical macrodynamic theorist is very explicit about the crucial role of the
computational experiment in macroedynamics ([25]). The concept and contents
of a computational experiment in a macrodynamic model is direct generalization
of the static computable general equilibrium framework (CGE ), particularly the
one having its origins in the work of Shoven and Whalley ([47]which, in turn, is
based on the pioneering contributions to the eld by Herbert Scarf ([43]):
"Shoven and Whalley ([47]) were the rst to use what we call the
computational experiment in economics. The model economies that
they used in their experiments are static and have many industrial
sectors."
Kydland & Prescott ([25], p. 69, footnote 2).
But Kydland and Prescott misrepresent the actual theoretical nature of the
computational model used in [47]. That model is neither constructive nor com-
putable, contrary to the claims in [47]. So, they could not be carrying out a
consistent computational experimentthat could be underpinned by any the-
ory. The hollowness of the claims of computability and constructivity - i.e., a
computational experiment - is fully described and elucidated in [63].
In the case of new classical macrodynamics there is also the particular and
peculiar reliance on the functional equations of Bellman. Almost the rst thing
an advanced undergraduate or a beginning graduate student is taught is the way
of formulating any given representative agents dynamic optimization problem
in terms of the Bellman equation. The particular forte of this formulation, as
claimed by most mathematical macroeconomists, is that it is in recursiveform
and hence amenable to a xed point approach(cf [1], p.12)! So, there we are;
back to square one on the conning front.
However, this is not entirely correct. It is not necessary to invoke the full
force of topological xed point theorems (cf. [30], p.275) and, therefore, one is
not saddled with the many whimsical conning mathematical assumptions that
make the computational experiment infeasible. It is onlynecessary to invoke
the contraction mapping theorem in metric spaces (cf [16], pp. 166-7 & p. 177) a
paper referred to at almost the very beginning of the Kydland-Prescott research
program (cf. [24]), by them, to codify the idea of the computational experiment).
But here, too, there are so many whimsical and fragile assumptions at the very
recesses of the mathematical framework that I am almost reluctant to saddle the
end of this already very long paper with their nature. But here is an ultra-brief
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hint. The contraction mapping theorem is dened on a complete metric space.
This characteristic is a generalization of the idea of Cauchy Completeness,
which is given by the theorem:
Theorem 43 Every Cauchy sequence in R converges to an element of R
This theorem is, in turn, proved using the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem,
which contains an unconstructiable - i.e., non-algorithmic and hence impossi-
ble to utilise in a consistent computational experiment- undecidable disjunc-
tion in its proof! And so we go on and on. Somewhere, buried in the recesses of
almost every mathematical result used by conventional mathematical macrody-
namics, there are undecidable disjunctions that make a mockery of the idea of
computational experiments. Nothing less than whimsey and fragility seem to be
the ultimate disciplining criteria for much of the mathematics of new classical
macrodynamics.
I shall not even begin to discuss the way recent modelling exercises by the
new classicals have relied on a continuum of agents in a way that makes any
notion of computation completely nonsensical.
5.4 Final Remarks
A continuum of agents populate many whimsical and fragile mathematical
macrodynamic models. Non-constructive and uncomputable xed point the-
orems are invoked to prove the existence of uncomputable equilibiria which are
then computed by uncomputable numerical procedures. Axioms whose implica-
tions are illusory are invoked routinely at the foundations of economic theory.
Such are the whimsies and fragilities of ordinary, bread-and-butter orthodox
mathematical and mathematized economic theory. To weed the whimsies and
fragilities out of these frameworks may not be a worthwhile exercise. To be
aware of them is, on the other hand, is almost imperative - so that related mis-
takes need not be made by a new generation of mathematically able, numerically
literate, computationally able, students of economics.
I should add here, in conclusion, that there are non-orthodox varieties of
economic theory with powerful mathematical underpinnings50 . For the purposes
of this paper I have concentrated on a few themes because it was possible to
frame them and tackle them from an almost unied or homogeneous point of
view. If this exercise is reasonably successful, I may undertake a broader study,
incorporating orthodox and non-orthodox mathematical economics in my quest
to ndthe Con that they, too, might encapsulate.
I can do no better than conclude this paper by recalling an eloquent ad-
monition by a distinguished mathematician who tried valiantly to construct a
mathematical economics without cons:
50 I have, in the rst instance, in mind Piero Sra¤as remarkable Production of Commodities
by Means of Commodities ([54]) and Jacob Schwartzs Lectures on the Analytical Method in
Economics ([44]). These two books, each in their own way, extol the virtues of non-orthodox
approaches to economics using non-routine mathematical tools, concepts, frameworks and
proof techniques. A rst pass at studying one of them is in ([64]).
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"The very fact that a theory appears in mathematical form, that,
for instance, a theory has provided the occasion for the application
of a xed-point theorem ... somehow makes us more ready to take
it seriously. ... The result, perhaps most common in the social sci-
ences, is bad theory with a mathematical passport. ... The intellectual
attractiveness of a mathematical argument, ...., makes mathematics
a powerful tool of intellectual prestidigitation - a glittering deception
in which some are entrapped, and some, alas, entrappers." ([45], pp.
22-3, italics added)
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